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Improving the climate 
Will the new Constitution strengthen the EU’s 
performance in international climate negotiations? 
Louise van Schaik and Christian Egenhofer 
 
Abstract 
This policy brief elaborates on the impact of the 
EU’s Constitutional Treaty on the preparation, 
formulation and adoption of the EU’s position in 
international climate change negotiations. The 
analysis focuses on how changes envisaged will 
affect the policy-making process and particularly 
on whether shortcomings identified in the current 
situation will be addressed. These shortcomings 
include the inherent potential for discontinuity in 
the common position and external representation 
due to the rotating Presidency system, the 
intensity and length of EU internal coordination, 
the technical and environmental focus of the 
policy-making process and finally questions on 
democratic legitimacy. 
The authors conclude that the long-term strategic 
perspective and coherence of the EU position in 
the climate change negotiations would benefit 
from a larger involvement of the Foreign 
Minister and European External Action Service 
envisaged in the Constitutional Treaty. If both 
were to obtain a role in preparing and negotiating 
the EU position in climate change, this could 
benefit the integration of climate change with 
other external policies of the EU. On the other 
hand, the new foreign policy machinery of the EU  
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presumably would not have the high level of environmental 
knowledge of climate change policy and its implementation 
that is available in the environment ministries. The degree 
of democratic legitimacy could benefit from the expected 
switch from consultation to consent required from the 
European Parliament for the conclusion (ratification) of 
international climate agreements by the European Union. 
Finally, the inclusion of the principle of ‘participatory 
democracy’ in the Constitutional Treaty, which could lead 
to more involvement of relevant stakeholders, might add to 
a higher legitimacy of the EU position in the international 
climate change negotiations. 
1. Introduction 
The Kyoto Protocol, signed in 1997 and supplemented with 
the Marrakech Accords in 2001, has finally entered into 
force on 16 February 2005. Already from the beginning, 
but especially after the US rejected the Kyoto Protocol in 
2001, the EU has dedicated itself to making the 
international climate change agreement a success. The EU 
member states, having forged a common position, 
politically committed themselves to “keeping Kyoto alive” 
and convinced others, most notably Japan, Canada and 
eventually Russia, to pursue ratification. The EU’s 
performance as a climate negotiator was uneven over time, 
however. Criticism of its performance focused on the 
functioning of key EU players, such as the rotating EU 
Presidency, and on the process of EU coordination to arrive 
at common positions. Both the position of key players in 
the policy-making process and the conduct of the 
negotiations are intrinsically linked to the assignment of 
competences among the EU institutions and the prevailing 
decision-making procedures. Therefore, any discussions of 
the EU’s performance in the climate negotiations
1 should 
be seen in the context of a more general debate on EU 
institutional reform. 
                                                 
1 In this article, international climate negotiations are the 
negotiations that are conducted in the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The 
most important climate agreement negotiated in the UNFCCC 
so far is the Kyoto Protocol. 
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The EU debate on institutional reform took place inter alia 
in the European Convention, held in 2002-2003, with the 
aim of making the EU more effective and legitimate and 
resulting in a draft Constitutional Treaty for the EU that 
would replace the current EU and EC
2 Treaties. On the 
basis of this draft, the EU member states in a so-called 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) eventually adopted in 
June 2004 a “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe” 
(hereafter referred to as the Constitutional Treaty). The 
EU’s role in the world was one of the key agenda items of 
the Convention. The debate, taking place during the 
political divide in Europe over the Iraq war, focused 
foremost on security and defence issues, but also had 
relevance for other areas of EU external action, such as the 
EU’s activities in the international climate negotiations. 
This policy brief analyses the institutional changes 
regarding EU external action and other proposed changes 
envisaged in the Constitutional Treaty, as they are relevant 
for the way the EU formulates its position for and conducts 
negotiations on international climate agreements.  
Before its entry into force, the Constitutional Treaty must 
be ratified by all the EU member states and be approved in 
several national referenda. Nevertheless, we think it is 
worthwhile to assess its potential implications, since many 
of the changes might be implemented ahead of the official 
ratification. In particular we assess whether the changes 
could increase the i) long-term strategic perspective, ii) 
consistency, iii) environmental effectiveness and iv) 
democratic legitimacy of the EU’s position in international 
climate negotiations.  
This policy brief is structured as follows. First we analyse 
the current institutional set-up of the EU in the climate 
negotiations and identify potential shortcomings. Secondly 
we present relevant changes as envisaged in the 
Constitutional Treaty, as well as a system of issue-
leadership for external representation as developed and 
implemented by the participants of the Council Working 
Group on climate change. In the conclusion, we analyse the 
changes in light of above-mentioned criteria.  
2.  The Institutional Set-up of the EU in 
International Climate Negotiations 
Climate change as part of the environment chapter of the 
current EC Treaty is a shared competence of both the EU 
member states and the European Community.
3 As a result, 
both the EC
4 and the member states are signatories to the 
Kyoto Protocol and both have legally binding reduction 
                                                 
2 For the difference between the EU and the EC, see glossary 
of abbreviations and terms. 
3 See Lavranos (2002) for a comprehensive overview of the 
decision-making competencies regarding multilateral 
environmental agreements. 
4 In policy areas where the EC has a competence to regulate, it 
is also designated to represent the EU externally. In the case of 
environmental policy, there is a shared competence (member 
states and EC) that is externalised (Leal-Arcas, 2001).  
targets in greenhouse gas emissions. To reach these 
objectives, there is a mixture of both national (e.g. taxation) 
and EC (e.g. the EU emissions trading scheme) policies, 
following the rules of the EU and mainly the EC treaties. 
The organisation of decision-making on the formulation of 
negotiating positions differs from decision-making on 
‘domestic’ EU policy measures (i.e. so-called ‘common and 
coordinated measures’), such as the adoption of the EU 
emissions trading scheme. 
The common and coordinated measures are governed by 
the standard Community method of decision-making: the 
European Commission has the right of initiative for 
legislation, while the European Parliament and the Council 
of Ministers (i.e. member states) decide through the co-
decision procedure.
5 In multilateral climate negotiations the 
EU member states and the EC operate with a common 
negotiation position. The formulation of this position is, as 
in the case of other external policies, more 
intergovernmentally organised, reflecting the member 
states’ preference for being the prime actor in the 
negotiation of (most) international agreements.
  
In some multilateral environment negotiations, the 
Commission represents not only the EC, but also the EU 
member states, but according to Art. 174 of the 
environment chapter of the EC Treaty, the EU member 
states are also in a position to negotiate on their own 
behalf.
6 With regard to the international climate 
negotiations, the EU Council of Ministers has been strict in 
using this provision, i.e. the Council has not authorised the 
Commission to conduct the negotiations on behalf of the 
EU member states. Instead, the half-yearly rotating 
Presidency of the EU is the main representative of the EU 
(member states and the EC). Together with the next 
(incoming) Presidency and the European Commission, it 
forms the so-called ‘troika’,
7 which conducts the most 
important negotiations for the EU. The Presidency and the 
troika operate with a relatively strict mandate from the 
Environment Council of Ministers.  
As a result of the shared competence, the policy-making 
process regarding the EU position for international climate 
negotiations has thus both an EC component and a member 
state component. According to the EC Treaty (Art. 10, 
TEC), the EU member states have to support the 
Community’s task and the objectives of the Treaty. One of 
                                                 
5 See glossary of abbreviations and terms. 
6 The legal basis for the division of competence in multilateral 
environmental agreements is Art. 174 para. 4 (TEC). It refers 
to Art. 300 (TEC), which states that with regard to Community 
policies it is the Commission that will be authorised by the 
Council to negotiate international agreements with third 
countries. The last sentence of Art. 174 §4 stipulates however 
that “the previous subparagraph shall be without prejudice to 
member states’ competence to negotiate in international 
bodies and to conclude international agreements”. 
7 The role of the troika is not legally defined. Legally 
speaking, the troika only exists in the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy of the EU. IMPROVING THE CLIMATE | 3 
 
which is “promoting measures at international level to deal 
with regional or worldwide environmental problems” (Art. 
174 §1, TEC). In practical terms the EU member states and 
the EC thus have to work together and they have to come 
up with common positions for the international climate 
negotiations.  
As with most EU policies, the position for the international 
climate negotiations is agreed through the Council 
hierarchy, starting from the Council Working Group on 
climate change,
8 via COREPER-I
9 to the final round and 
official decision-making in the Environment Council of 
Ministers (see Figure 1). Usually the Presidency prepares 
the draft position and not the Commission, which in the 
standard Community method has the right of initiative. 
During climate change negotiations, the EU (i.e. 
delegations of the member states) decides in daily 
coordination meetings how to adjust its position to reach 
agreement with other negotiating parties. These ‘Council of 
Ministers meetings at location’ take place behind closed 
doors with no observers allowed either from interest groups 
or from the European Parliament delegation. National 
parliamentarians may attend the coordination meeting when 
they are part of the national delegation, which is the case in 
some member states, but not in others. 
In addition to the official EU’s position formulated in the 
Council conclusions, there is a second track position, 
written down in so-called ‘submissions’, which are 
technical positions made by expert groups and approved 
directly by the Council Working Group on climate change 
                                                 
8 The official Working Party on International Environment 
Issues is divided into two working groups: a) global 
environmental aspects of sustainable developments and b) 
climate change. 
9 See glossary of abbreviations and terms.  
(see Figure 1). The technical submissions have sometimes 
pre-empted the official EU position and are otherwise 
specifications of the EU position. Therefore, they should be 
considered an integral part of the EU’s position.
10  
Although most issues concerning the EU position in 
international climate change negotiations are prepared and 
settled by the Council of Ministers, the European Council, 
i.e. the European heads of states and governments, becomes 
involved in some highly political and strategic issues. 
When the US withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, 
the European Council came out with a strong statement that 
the EU would fulfil its Kyoto commitments unilaterally if 
needed (European Council, 2001a). Ever since, 
international climate change policy is periodically 
discussed. For the 2005 Spring European Council the issue 
of medium- and long-term strategies for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions is on the agenda. 
The link between achievements in domestic greenhouse gas 
reduction, where the Commission has a larger role, and the 
external position has become more visible over the years. 
For example to prepare its strategy for medium- and long-
term emissions reduction, the European Council asked the 
European Commission to prepare a cost-benefit analysis 
(European Council, 2004). The report should of course be 
seen in conjunction with input from the EU Council of 
Ministers, i.e. its Council conclusions, but it is nevertheless 
interesting to see that the Commission has obtained a more 
substantial role in the preparation of the EU’s long-term 
climate change vision. 
                                                 
10 For example, a submission called ‘Estimates of Emissions 
of Carbon Dioxide from Forest Harvesting and Wood 
Products’ in FCCC/SBSTA/2001/LISC.1, Subsidiary Body for 
Scientific and Technological Advice, 14 May 2001, took a 
rather strict position towards a certain type of sink, while the 
Council conclusions had become more lenient. Submissions 
can be found on line (see http://www.unfccc.int). 
Council of Environment 
Ministers
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Figure 1. Decision-making on EU’s position in climate negotiations in the Council of (Environment) Ministers4 | Van Schaik & Egenhofer 
 
The European Parliament’s role in the policy-making 
process is limited: it only has to be informed about the 
negotiations and consulted for the conclusion
11 of 
international environmental agreements, but this ‘opinion’ 
can be neglected by the Council of Ministers. The 
Council’s perogative to neglect the outcome of the EP’s 
vote reduces the credibility of any threat by the EP to vote 
down an international climate change agreement. 
2.1  Criticism of the current institutional set-up 
It would be naive to assume that the negotiations 
themselves can be separated from the preparation of the 
negotiations (i.e. the formulation of EU positions). The 
‘Council of Ministers meetings at location’ supply the best 
proof of this. Thus, when addressing potential shortcomings 
of how the EU conducts its negotiations, one needs to start 
with the way positions are formulated.  
•  The negotiations are mainly dealt with by climate 
change experts and not at the political level (i.e. 
ministers). Because many decisions are taken in 
specialised expert groups (on sinks, Clean Development 
Mechanism, etc.), it is easy to lose sight of the broader 
picture. This is one of the constraints operating against 
the development of a long-term strategy that 
encompasses all aspects and policy options.  
•  The formulation of the position is primarily 
intergovernmental, where member states dominate. 
Although decisions on the EC’s position in climate 
negotiations might formally be taken by qualified 
majority voting,
12 any decision on the EU member 
states’ part of the common EU position has to be taken 
by unanimous agreement. This often leads to very strict 
positions, which constrain the flexibility of the EU 
negotiators and the long-term strategic perspective of 
the overall position.  
•  In climate negotiations, the performance of the EU is 
closely related to the performance of the Presidency. 
Since the Presidency is changing every half year, there 
is a relatively high chance of inconsistencies in 
performance and actual positions. This semi-annual 
change in leadership can also be a constraining factor 
regarding the formulation of a long-term strategic 
perspective. Some observers of the climate negotiations 
have argued that it would benefit the EU’s performance 
if the Commission were to lead the negotiations and not 
the Presidency (Grubb & Yamin, 2001; Lacasta et al., 
                                                 
11 ‘Conclusion’ of international agreements is EU jargon for 
ratification. 
12 See glossary for an explanation of QMV. It has been argued 
by EU member states that climate change policies would fall 
under unanimity, given that Art. 175 (2), which stipulates the 
exceptions for the use of QMV, refers to “measures 
significantly affecting a member state’s choice between 
different energy sources and the general structure of its energy 
supply” (Lacasta et al., 2002). 
2002; and McCormick, 2002). Owing to institutional 
and political reasons, this has proved impossible in the 
past (Lacasta et al., 2002).  
•  The current way the EU formulates its negotiation 
position is heavily geared towards the environmental 
decision-making machinery. While it appears normal 
that climate change policy is dealt with by the 
environment configuration of the Council of Ministers, 
one must question whether this allows for sufficient 
consistency and coherence with economic and trade 
concerns, and notably, foreign policy interests.  
•  EU member states have tended to spend far more time 
with each other in coordination meetings than actually 
negotiating with and listening to their negotiation 
partners. The EU seems to suffer from ‘navel gazing’ 
behaviour during the negotiations because consensus 
between the EU member states needs to be reached on 
all important issues coming up during the negotiations.  
•  The European Parliament (as the ‘voice of the people’) 
is almost entirely absent, which raises some questions 
regarding the democratic legitimacy base of the EU in 
climate negotiations. Both the European Parliament and 
the national parliaments often find themselves 
confronted with a fait accompli after international 
agreements are signed. 
Some of the shortcomings have been addressed, including 
incremental institutional change such as a stronger role for 
COREPER,  more involvement of economic, trade and 
foreign ministries and greater general flexibility in the 
common negotiation position. Many of these changes have 
been implemented in the aftermath of the failure of the 
talks in The Hague in 2000. They might have led to 
improvements in the EU’s performance in Bonn and 
Marrakech in 2001, but did not fundamentally alter the way 
the EU position is formulated. For this to occur, a more 
fundamental revision of the EU’s institutions and decision-
making would be needed, such as the one agreed upon by 
the Intergovernmental Conference in June 2004, when it 
adopted the Constitutional Treaty.   
3.  Reforming the EU Institutions  
This section discusses several relevant issues in the 
Constitutional Treaty to the extent that they address the 
identified shortcomings. We also briefly analyse a change 
that has recently been implemented by the members of the 
Council Working Group on climate change in the external 
representation of the EU in the climate negotiations, but 
that is unrelated to the changes in the Constitutional Treaty.  
3.1  Merging the EU and EC Treaties 
The article in the environment chapter on the EU in 
international organisations and platforms (Art. 174 §4, 
TEC) has not been altered with the exception of a change of 
the word “Community” into “Union” (see Art. III-233 §4, 
Constitution). This is because the Constitutional Treaty IMPROVING THE CLIMATE | 5 
 
merges the current EU and EC Treaties. In fact, everything 
has become EU, changing concepts like ‘Community 
competence’ into ‘Union competence’. The EU will 
thereby presumably replace the EC as a Party to 
international climate agreements. It can be argued that the 
current situation in which both the EC and the EU member 
states are Parties is slightly strange, since at the end of the 
day they are both members of the same ‘club’. The new 
situation seems to be even more schizophrenic with both 
the club (i.e. the EU) and the club members (i.e. the EU 
member states) acting as Parties. This could in the future 
possibly lead to a more fundamental debate on whether the 
EU can be regarded as a state in the context of several 
international organisations in which the EC currently 
participates as a Party.  
3.2 Council  configurations 
The European Convention proposed the establishment of a 
Legislative Council configuration in the Council of 
Ministers, in which all legislation under co-decision would 
be decided upon in public.
13 The idea was ruled out by the 
EU member states at one of the first sessions of the IGC. 
Instead, it was decided that meetings of the Council of 
Ministers would be opened up when it decides upon 
legislative acts (Art. I-24 §6, Constitution). The EU 
position for the UNFCCC is not a legislative act and will 
therefore remain behind closed doors.  
The idea behind the Legislative Council was not only to 
increase the transparency of the Council of Ministers, but 
also to reduce the number of Council configurations to 
counter the compartmentalisation of sectoral interests, such 
as environmental interests. By rejecting the idea for the 
Legislative Council, the IGC therefore implicitly also 
rejected the idea of reducing the number of Council 
configurations. Under the Constitutional Treaty, the 
European Council will decide upon the list of other Council 
configurations (in addition to the General Affairs Council 
and the Foreign Affairs Council, which are explicitly 
mentioned). Since the number of Council formations was 
recently changed by the Seville Council in 2002, the 
existence of the Environment configuration does not seem 
to be directly threatened. The debate on 
compartmentalisation may however continue ‘below the 
surface’ and return to the political reform agenda in the 
future.  
3.3  Presidency of the Council of Ministers 
A much-debated issue has been the rotating Presidency of 
the Council of Ministers. It was decided that the system 
will no longer apply for the European Council, the Foreign 
Affairs Council and the Euro-Group Council of Economic 
and Financial Affairs. For these configurations a more 
permanent President or chair will be appointed (Devuyst, 
                                                 
13 For a more detailed account of this proposal, see Van Schaik 
& Egenhofer (2003). 
2004, CER, 2004). For the other Council configurations, 
the European Convention proposed to increase the period 
of time held by the chair to one year and to make it more 
flexible to decide which member state would chair which 
Council configuration.
14 
The IGC decided instead on a rather minimal formulation 
in the Constitutional Treaty which merely stipulates a 
system of equal rotation whose conditions will be 
established by the European Council (Art. I-24 §7, 
Constitution). At the same time it made a declaration in one 
of the annexes to the Constitutional Treaty laying down a 
“Draft European decision of the European Council on the 
exercise of the Presidency of the Council” (document CIG 
87/04), proposing a system whereby three member states 
together hold overall responsibility for the Presidency for a 
period of 18 months. Each member of the group will in 
principle chair for a six-month period, but together the 
three member states will operate on the basis of a common 
programme and the three member states among each other 
“may decide alternative arrangements among themselves”.  
The envisaged system for the Presidency would thus be 
very similar to the current system of the half-yearly rotating 
Presidency, except that it establishes a stronger group 
responsibility, for example via the presentation of common 
programmes. It also grants slightly more flexibility to 
member states to decide upon a share of the burden, which 
might be particularly relevant for the smaller EU member 
states. The draft decision obtained formal approval by the 
Council in December 2004, in conjunction with a decision 
on which combinations of countries will be formed to hold 
the Presidency until 2020 (Council, 2004).  
An important question is whether the EU Presidency will 
maintain a role in the external representation of the EU. 
This is discussed below following the introduction of a new 
actor with potential relevance for EU diplomacy in the field 
of climate change, the EU Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
3.4  The proposed Minister for Foreign Affairs 
and the European External Action Service 
The Constitutional Treaty establishes an EU Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, a ‘double-hatted’ position bringing 
together  ad personam the current functions of the High 
Representative for the CFSP
15 and those of the 
Commissioner for External Relations (Crum, 2003). This 
person would lead a European External Action Service 
(EEAS) that brings together the staff of the Commission’s 
                                                 
14 See Van Schaik & Egenhofer (2003) for a more elaborate 
account. 
15 The High Representative of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) assists the EU Presidency in matters 
relating to the common foreign and security policy. The 
position is held by the Secretary-General of the Council. The 
High Representative also helps in formulating, preparing and 
implementing policy decisions by the Council. He or she may 
conduct political dialogue with third parties, on the Council's 
behalf and at the request of the Presidency. 6 | Van Schaik & Egenhofer 
 
Directorate-General on External Relations,
16 the staff of the 
High Representative for the CFSP and staff seconded from 
national diplomatic services (Art. III-296 §3, Constitution). 
The new Minister for Foreign Affairs will be appointed by 
the European Council and will be one of the Vice-
Presidents of the European Commission. He or she shall 
conduct the Union’s CFSP and will “be responsible within 
the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in 
external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the 
Union’s external action” (Art. I-28, Constitution).  
In the UNFCCC, other countries enter the stage with 
diplomats (e.g. US) or inter-ministerial negotiating teams 
(e.g. Japan). Involvement of the new EU Foreign Minister 
in the EU’s activities in the UNFCCC could advance the 
integration of climate change with other policy areas, 
notably with other external policies. Yet it can be 
questioned if diplomats and foreign ministers have 
sufficient command of the content of the policy area, 
compared to officials of environment ministries and their 
ministers. It is important to realise that the implementation 
of international agreements would remain the responsibility 
of the policy ‘environment track’, whereby support from 
the ‘energy track’ is usually essential, as well as support 
from the ‘development track’ for yet other aspects. The 
EU’s credibility in the international negotiations is to a 
large extent dependent on the success of this policy 
implementation. Therefore, it is important to secure a 
sufficient level of environmental policy knowledge in case 
the Foreign Minister and his/her External Action Service 
would become more involved.  
It can actually be expected that the Foreign Minister and 
his/her External Action Service will claim a larger role vis-
à-vis the climate change dossier, since the Minister will 
become responsible for coordinating the Union’s external 
action. This would presumably include keeping a close eye 
on the external policy activities of other Commissioners, 
such as the Environment Commissioner. The Presidency of 
the Foreign Affairs Council furthermore could enable him 
or her to watch over the external activities of the other 
Council configurations, including those of the Environment 
Council.  
3.5  The new article on international 
agreements: More or less ambiguity?  
“The Union’s External Action” is the new heading in the 
Constitutional Treaty in which several aspects of EU 
foreign policy are grouped together, including the CFSP 
and the Common Commercial Policy (international trade 
policy). The section is preceded by some general 
objectives, thereby underlining the need for coherence 
between the different parts of the EU external action (Art. 
III-292, Constitution; Cremona, 2003; De Witte, 2003). A 
chapter on International Agreements sets out the procedure 
for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements between 
                                                 
16 DG External Relations (RELEX) deals with the EU-UN 
relationship, among other things.  
the Union and third countries or international organisations 
(Art. III-325, Constitution).
17 According to this article, 
either the European Commission or the EU’s Minister of 
Foreign Affairs may ask the Council of Ministers to “open 
negotiations”. It is up to the Council of Ministers to appoint 
out of these two the Union negotiator or head of the 
Union’s negotiating team, whereby the Foreign Minister 
will be appointed regarding CFSP issues.  
Regardless of who becomes the Union’s negotiator, the EU 
member states retain their sole right to negotiate in 
international bodies as a result of the maintenance of the 
shared competence in the field of environmental policy.
18 
This implies that the common position will remain an EC 
(this would become EU) and EU member state component 
and that therefore consensus by all EU member states 
would remain a necessity in order to arrive at this common 
position. Moreover it means that the EU member states 
might still decide to authorise the Presidency of the Council 
of Ministers to speak on their behalf.  
The article does not clearly stipulate which actor makes the 
proposal for the EU’s position in climate negotiations, 
although it speaks about negotiating directives, which 
would presumably apply for the “Union” part of the EU 
position for international climate negotiations. A transfer of 
the activities to draft the EU’s position from the Presidency 
to the Commission as is currently the case for the EU 
position in the WTO, or to the European External Action 
Service (EEAS), would reduce the workload for the 
rotating Presidency. It could also offer an opportunity to 
increase the consistency of the EU’s position in climate 
negotiations. If the EEAS were to prepare the negotiating 
positions, it could furthermore foster the coherence of the 
position with other external policies of the EU.  
It might be appropriate to include the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs in the Union’s negotiation team (a troika-like 
construction). This would probably increase the diplomatic 
character, the continuity of the position and the coherence 
with other policies. It would also give outsiders a clearer 
view of whom to address. The EU Foreign Minister, or one 
of his or her delegates might however not possess the 
knowledge and resources to obtain all the details of the 
environmental technicalities of the issues at stake. 
Reducing the Presidency’s role regarding the preparation of 
the position might furthermore decrease the member states’ 
sense of ownership over the climate change file.  
We have seen that the rotating Presidency system for the 
Environment configuration of the Council of Ministers is 
likely to stay largely the same. Moreover, the Presidency is 
                                                 
17 The article can be regarded as a revised version of Art. 300 
(TEC). 
18 In this respect, it is especially important to note the last 
sentence of Art. III-233 §4, Constitution (environment 
chapter), which reads: “The previous subparagraph shall be 
without prejudice to member states’ competence to negotiate 
in international bodies and to conclude international 
agreements”.  IMPROVING THE CLIMATE | 7 
 
likely to maintain its role regarding the external 
representation of the EU member states, since their right to 
negotiate on their own behalf has prevailed. This implies 
that the identified shortcomings originating from the 
“rotating leadership” on the issue of external climate 
change policy have not been fundamentally addressed in 
the Constitutional Treaty.  
3.6  The role of the EP 
The new article on international agreements touches upon 
the role of the European Parliament. Legal experts De 
Witte (2003) and Cremona (2003) argue that the 
Constitutional Treaty will strengthen the role of the EP in 
the areas of external relations that do not fall within the 
CFSP. The new element is the extension of the use of the 
consent procedure (currently known as the assent 
procedure, i.e. an approval vote by the EP on the basis of a 
simple majority). Consent will become required for 
“agreements covering fields to which the ordinary 
legislative procedure applies, or the special legislative 
procedure where consent by the European Parliament is 
required” (Art. III-325 §6a(v), Constitution). This will lead 
to a quite remarkable change for trade agreements as they 
would become subject to the European Parliament’s 
approval (Art. 300(3), TEC).  
The situation is nevertheless ambiguous for climate change. 
It is unclear whether the “ordinary legislative procedure” 
applies, meaning co-decision used in combination with 
QMV.
19 At first the answer would be positive since so far 
the co-decision procedure has applied for EC legislation in 
the field of climate change, whereby the voting procedure 
in the Council of Ministers is QMV. But at times it has 
been disputed whether unanimity or QMV should apply for 
climate change policy. It is argued by some member states 
that climate change affects “the Member State’s choice 
between different energy sources and the general structure 
of its energy supply”, one of the derogations for the use of 
QMV mentioned in the Environment chapter (Art. 175 §2c, 
TEC, Art. III-234 §2c, Constitution). Unanimity would 
imply that the “ordinary legislative procedure” does not 
apply. In this respect it is interesting to look at the 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002 (Council, 2002). 
Here a choice was made for Art. 175 §1 (QMV), i.e. the 
ordinary legislative procedure under the Constitutional 
Treaty. With QMV, the consent procedure under the new 
rules of the Constitutional Treaty would apply.  
At the present time, consultation is the applied procedure 
(Art. 300 §3). For example, if the EP had declined to ratify 
the Kyoto Protocol, following the consultation procedure, 
the Council of Ministers could have set aside this 
judgement if acting unanimously. With the consent 
procedure it can no longer disregard the EP’s vote. The EP 
will actually be able to threaten to reject an international 
agreement unless its viewpoints or certain procedural 
                                                 
19 See glossary of abbreviations and terms for QMV and co-
decision procedure. 
conditions are taken into account. Nonetheless, it might still 
remain difficult for the EP to become more demanding, 
since the Council knows that it is almost unthinkable for 
the EP to vote down an international environmental 
agreement, since the EP is generally known for being more 
“green” than the Council. Therefore it remains to be seen 
whether the introduction of the consent procedure will 
really change the situation as it stands today. 
3.7 Participatory  democracy 
A new provision on participatory democracy (Art. I-46) 
assigns an important role to the participation of citizens and 
civil society organisations in the policy-making process. It 
also introduces the possibility of a citizens’ initiative, 
whereby “one million citizens can invite the Commission to 
draft a proposal on an issue of their concern”. The 
increased attention given to the involvement of citizens and 
the groups representing them is part of a broader debate on 
legitimacy, which is also addressed in the European 
Commission’s White Paper on Governance (Commission, 
2001). This document aims to set out a framework for 
interest group participation and representation to increase 
the support for new policy proposals in civil society and 
thereby to increase their legitimacy. Certainly in the area of 
environmental policy, (technical) input from potentially 
affected companies as well as from NGOs is generally 
regarded to be of high value and appreciated for increasing 
the quality of EC legislation.  
The provision for participatory democracy in the 
Constitutional Treaty appears to be designed for situations 
where the Commission has the right of initiative. For 
negotiating positions, this is not automatically the case and 
therefore the new provision might not be particularly 
relevant. If the Council remains the centre of gravity for the 
EU position in international climate change negotiations, 
interest groups can be expected to stay focused on the 
national level. In this case it might be easier for some 
interest groups than for others to reach out to all member 
states. The accessibility of the national delegates is 
furthermore constrained by the large amount of time they 
spend in internal EU coordination meetings.  
If the Commission or the European External Action Service 
obtains a larger role in the preparation of the EU’s position, 
however, the provisions might become more interesting. 
The stakeholder consultations the European Commission is 
already organising on a regular basis offer an example of 
how this might work out in practice.  
3.8  Reform outside the Constitutional Treaty: 
The system of issue leaders 
National delegates in the Council Working Group on 
climate change have implemented some changes regarding 
the representation of the EU in the climate negotiations 
largely unrelated to the Constitutional Treaty. Although 
climate change might seem a relatively homogenous 
subject to outsiders, insiders know that there are several 8 | Van Schaik & Egenhofer 
 
issues within the UNFCCC that are treated more or less 
separately from each other in the negotiations, e.g. sinks, 
technology transfer, methods to monitor greenhouse gas 
emissions, national communications, etc. These issues 
roughly correlate with the expert groups established in the 
Council working group on climate change. In the past it 
accidentally occurred that the expert groups were not led by 
the Presidency’s’ participant, but by for instance a 
representative of the former Presidency or even by the 
European Commission. Reasons included a lack of 
resources by the Presidency, temporary illness or for 
instance the finalisation of a specific file on which the past 
Presidency had key knowledge (e.g. the Swedes remained 
delegation leader during the Belgian Presidency on the 
issue of sinks).  
Taking into account the burden for the country holding the 
Presidency and the potential inefficiency of the half-yearly 
changing leadership, the working group decided to assign 
so-called ‘issue leaders’ on a more permanent basis for 
specific fields, which work in conjunction with the lead 
negotiator from the Presidency. The issue leaders are 
experienced experts that carry out their task under the 
overall responsibility of the Presidency. In their field they 
remain EU negotiator over a longer time-frame and can 
thereby establish more stable contacts with negotiating 
partners, more solid knowledge and consistency in the 
position. Different EU member states thereby will obtain 
the possibility to specialise in specific issues, leaving the 
Presidency more space to focus on the overall strategy. A 
disadvantage of the increased role of specialised experts 
may be that they are typically difficult to control, because 
their knowledge is so specific. Although the Presidency 
keeps its responsibility, it remains to be seen if it can 
actually ensure the compatibility of specific positions in for 
instance the technical submissions with the EU’s overall 
climate change strategy, particularly if such issues cover a 
time period spanning several Presidencies. 
4. Conclusions 
At the beginning of this paper, we introduced four criteria 
for assessing the proposed changes: long-term strategic 
perspective, consistency, environmental effectiveness and 
democratic legitimacy of the EU’s position in the 
international climate negotiations. We use them to analyse 
the changes envisaged in the Constitutional Treaty (sections 
3.1-3.7) as well as the new system of issue leadership 
(section 3.8). 
The strategic perspective of the EU in the climate change 
negotiations at times has been constrained by the way the 
EU’s position is formulated and negotiated. One of the 
main causes – the system of the rotating Presidency of the 
Council of Ministers and its large role in representing the 
EU member states externally – has not been addressed by 
changes in the Constitutional Treaty. Involvement of the 
Foreign Minister and External Action Service could offer 
an opportunity for increased strategic perspective of the 
EU’s position in climate negotiations, because they will 
presumably focus on the EU’s long-term diplomatic 
relations. Also the system of issue leaders could improve 
the long-term strategic perspective, particularly concerning 
specific issues. The larger degree of specialisation could 
however conflict with maintaining some flexibility in how 
to reach the EU’s overall objectives in the field of climate 
change. 
The consistency over time of the EU’s position in the 
UNFCCC has at times been disturbed by the half-yearly 
change of leadership due to the system of the rotating 
Presidency. As for the Environment Council, this system 
will presumably remain similar to the current system. The 
issue-leadership system, as designed by the climate 
negotiators themselves, addresses the consistency issue to 
some extent. Another solution would be more involvement 
of the Commission or External Action Service, for example 
regarding the preparation of the EU’s position.  
It is perhaps more difficult to ensure consistency with other 
EU policies. The current process of arriving at the EU 
position and conducting the actual negotiations are largely 
dominated by the Environment Ministers and their 
administrations. More involvement of non-environmental 
interests could be pursued by giving a larger role to the EU 
Foreign Minister and the European External Action 
Service. The preparation of a formal policy proposal for the 
EU position by the European Commission could also 
increase the integration with other interests, since approval 
of the College of Commissioners by simple majority voting 
would in this case presumably be required, leaving space to 
incorporate other interests. The most important question 
remaining in such a scenario is how to ensure sufficient 
environmental knowledge regarding climate change policy 
and its implementation.  
It can be expected that Environment Ministers and their 
officials have the best knowledge of the content of the EU’s 
position. This would presumably benefit the environmental 
effectiveness of the EU position. From a purely 
environmental perspective, therefore, the best option would 
be to leave external climate change policy with the 
Environment Ministers, as it is today.  
The environmental effectiveness might also be improved by 
more involvement of relevant stakeholders as long as this 
occurs in a balanced and transparent way. Solutions offered 
by the private sector could for instance be more in line with 
business conduct and thereby easier to implement. The 
EU’s strength in international negotiations might also 
increase if it can prove that its position is backed by large 
segments of civil society. Actively using the new 
provisions for participatory democracy could be useful in 
this respect. 
Democratic legitimacy will increase when the procedure for 
the EP’s involvement will switch from consultation to the 
consent procedure as is most likely the case. It remains to 
be seen whether this formal right can actually be transposed 
in political reality, i.e. the balance of power between the 
Council, Commission and EP and what this means for the 
conduct of the negotiations.  IMPROVING THE CLIMATE | 9 
 
The Constitutional Treaty – assuming it enters into force – 
will probably lead to substantial changes in the way the EU 
operates. For the EU as a negotiator in the UNFCCC, we 
identified small modifications that promise some 
interesting opportunities. The potential involvement of the 
EU Foreign Minister and the External Action Service offers 
the largest scope of increasing both the strategic 
perspective and the consistency of the EU’s position in 
climate negotiations. Environmental effectiveness would 
need to be safeguarded, however, by ensuring a sufficient 
level of knowledge on climate change, the history of the 
negotiations, the technical details of certain dossiers, 
existing links with other policy fields, etc.  
Finally, democratic legitimacy could be increased by more 
involvement of the European Parliament during the 
negotiating process. This legitimacy might furthermore be 
strengthened by seeking more input and support from 
groups in civil society, for instance by using the new 
provision on participatory democracy.  
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Glossary of abbreviations and terms 
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy, second pillar of the European Union that deals 
with security and defence issues. The EU position for climate negotiations is not 
considered to be a CFSP issue, but an external issue of the EC pillar. 
Co-decision  Under the co-decision procedure (Art. 251 of the EC Treaty) the European Parliament and 
the Council jointly adopt instruments. The procedure comprises two readings. 
COREPER  Comité des Répresentants Permanents (Committee of Permanent Representatives), 
consisting of the member states’ EU ambassadors, called ‘Permanent Representatives’. 
COREPER consists of COREPER I, dealing with EC business such as the internal market 
including the environment and COREPER II, dealing with ‘high politics’ such as foreign 
policy. The body prepares Council of Ministers meetings and may decide on issues of a 
secondary or technical order to decrease the workload during Council meetings. 
Council of Ministers  Officially the Council of the EU, usually referred to as Council or Council of Ministers, 
consists of the portfolio ministers of the EU member states. The Council adopts laws, 
often in co-decision with the European Parliament.   
EEAS  European External Action Service, a newly to be established diplomatic service for the 
EU. 
European  Commission  The EU’s executive body, it proposes legislation, looks after implementation of 
legislation and is the guardian of the treaties. It is composed of 25 independent members, 
i.e. the European Commissioners, one from each EU member state. 
EC  European Community, the pillar of the European Union in which the Community policies 
are placed. The EC has legal personality and falls under the jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Justice, i.e. EU “supreme court”.  
European Council  Consists of the heads of government and state and the European Commission President. It 
meets four times a year to provide guidance on the day-to-day management of the EU and 
to take strategic decisions. 
EU  European Union, a sui generis polity, with intergovernmental and supranational 
characteristics. The EU is currently composed of 25 member states. Its activities are 
grouped in three pillars: the EC pillar, the CFSP pillar and the Justice and Home Affairs 
pillar. 
IGC  Intergovernmental Conference. Negotiations between the member state governments with 
a view to amending the treaties. 
Presidency  The Presidency of the EU is held in turn on a six-monthly basis by each member state. 
The Presidency chairs the meetings of the European Council and Council of Ministers and 
represents the European Union externally in many international organisations. 
QMV  Qualified majority voting, indicates the number of votes required in the Council for a 
decision to be adopted. Member states’ votes are weighted on the basis of their population 
and corrected in favour of less-populated countries. A proposal is accepted if it is 
supported by 71% of the votes and represents at least 62% of the population.  
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, agreed at the UN Conference 
on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Its ultimate objective is to 
stabilise greenhouse gas emissions at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system. The most important climate agreement negotiated in 
the UNFCCC so far is the Kyoto Protocol.  
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